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Which way is which?  
Examining symbolic control of attention 
with compound arrow cues 
Mark Mills and Michael D. Dodd
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Corresponding author — Mark Mills mark.mills2@huskers.unl.edu 
Abstract 
Spatial symbols can generate attentional biases toward peripheral locations 
compatible with the symbol’s meaning. An important question concerns how 
one symbol is selected when competing symbols are present. Studies examin-
ing this issue for spatially distinct symbols have suggested that selection de-
pends on the task goals. In the present study, we examined whether the influ-
ence of competing symbolic stimuli (arrows) at different levels of structure on 
attentional control also depends on the task goals. Participants made simple de-
tection responses to a peripheral target preceded by a spatially uninformative 
compound arrow (global arrow composed of local arrows). In addition, partic-
ipants were required to perform a secondary task in which they matched the 
orientation of the global arrow (global task) or the location of a uniquely col-
ored local arrow (local task) to a test display presented immediately following a 
detection response. When the global and local arrows pointed at opposite loca-
tions, a local cueing effect emerged in the local task, and a global cueing effect 
in the global task, indicating that the task goals influenced the selection of the 
level of structure. However, when the local level was spatially neutral (global 
arrow, local rectangles), a cueing effect was observed independent of task, and 
when the global level was spatially neutral (global rectangle, local arrows), a 
cueing effect was observed in the local task only, suggesting that global process-
ing was obligatory and local processing optional. These findings suggest that at-
tentional effects triggered by the global level are more strongly reflexive than 
those triggered by the local level. 
Keywords: Attention, Symbolic control, Contingent capture, Compound cue, 
Global/local 
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Everyday visual environments generally contain more information 
than can be processed within a glance. As such, goal-directed percep-
tion and action depend on mechanisms of selective visual attention 
for prioritizing an endless stream of sensory input, and so giving more 
weight to those objects, locations, or events that require immediate 
or sustained processing. To understand how attention is prioritized 
and allocated to visual stimuli, a useful distinction is that between 
bottom-up (reflexive) and top-down (volitional) attentional control, 
with the former driven by the physical characteristics of a stimulus 
and the latter by the current goals of the observer (Corbetta & Shul-
man, 2002; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Itti & 
Koch, 2000; Jonides, 1981; Posner, 1980; see Yantis, 2000, for a re-
view). For example, an abrupt visual onset may on the one hand cap-
ture attention in a purely stimulus-driven manner (Enns, Austen, Di 
Lollo, Rauschenberger, & Yantis, 2001; Remington, Johnston, & Yan-
tis, 1986; Theeuwes, 1990, 1994; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). On the other 
hand, capture may be contingent on the top-down attentional set of 
an observer, such that the onset captures attention only if it shares a 
feature with an item in that set (Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk, Rem-
ington, & Johnston, 1992). 
Outside of the traditional top-down/bottom-up dichotomy, consid-
erable evidence exists indicating that various kinds of symbolic infor-
mation presented at fixation produce unintentional shifts of attention 
to peripheral locations that are compatible with the meaning of the 
symbol. For example, Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, and Godijn (2001) pre-
sented a centrally located directional arrow (e.g., <, >) or word (e.g., 
left, right), which was followed by a peripheral target requiring a de-
tection response. Targets were detected more quickly when they ap-
peared at the location indicated by the arrow or word (valid condition) 
than at another location (invalid condition). Importantly, this occurred 
even though these symbols were entirely irrelevant to the detection 
task, and observers were explicitly told that the symbols did not pre-
dict the location of the upcoming target (see also Ristic & Kingstone, 
2006, 2012; Ristic, Landry, & Kingstone, 2012). Similar findings have 
been observed for temporal words (e.g., tomorrow, yesterday; Weger 
& Pratt, 2008), words relating to concrete concepts (e.g., head, foot; 
Estes, Verges, & Barsalou, 2008), words relating to abstract concepts 
(e.g., god, devil; Chasteen, Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010), pictures relating to 
abstract concepts (e.g., liberal, conservative; Mills, Smith, Hibbing, & 
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Dodd, 2015), numbers (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003), and let-
ters (Dodd, Van der Stigchel, Leghari, Fung, & Kingstone, 2008). Taken 
together, these findings indicate that a broad range of visual symbols 
can produce unintentional shifts of attention (but see Fattorini, Pinto, 
Rotondaro, & Doricchi, 2015). 
Not all visual symbols capable of producing unintentional shifts of 
attention are likely to do so in all situations, however. For example, 
observers are sometimes faced with scenes in which one symbol is 
nested within another, potentially conflicting symbol (e.g., eyes look-
ing one way nested within a head looking another way). Assuming that 
shifts of attention cannot be made in two or more directions simulta-
neously, an important question is which level might be selected (e.g., 
global head or local eyes) to control the allocation of attention? In the 
present study, we examined this issue using compound stimuli for 
which observers should have no a priori basis for selecting one level 
over the other (a global arrow composed of local arrows). One possi-
bility is that the level that is relevant to the current task goal would 
be selected, and the arrow at this task-relevant level would then pro-
duce an unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for this hypothesis 
has come from research on the role of control settings in attentional 
capture. The framework of attentional control settings (Folk et al., 
1992) proposes that the processing of a stimulus feature is contingent 
on the task goal at hand, such that only stimuli possessing a task-rel-
evant feature can pass through a perceptual filter and enter working 
memory. For instance, Pratt and Hommel (2003) examined how one 
symbol is selected to control the allocation of attention when several 
symbols appear in the visual field. They found that in a field of spa-
tially distinct arrows, the arrow most likely to affect attentional con-
trol was the one that possessed a task-relevant feature of an expected 
target. This suggests that the unintentional effects of arrows depend 
on the cognitively represented task goal. Thus, the control-setting ac-
count predicts that only the arrow that shares a critical feature spec-
ified by top-down control settings will be selected to control the allo-
cation of attention. 
Another possibility is that the global level would be selected first, 
regardless of task, and that this global arrow would then produce 
an unintentional shift of attention. Evidence for this hypothesis has 
come from research on the role of global perceptual precedence in 
the perception of hierarchical structure. Global precedence (Navon, 
Mills  &  Dodd in  Atten Percept  Psychophys  78  (2016)      4
1977, 2003) proposes that perceptual processing is predisposed to fa-
vor the processing of “clusters,” such that the global form of a hier-
archical structure is registered earlier than its local constituents, re-
sulting in greater availability of the global than of the local percept. 
As such, processing of global information is assumed to be obliga-
tory, whereas the processing of local information is optional. Navon 
(1977) tested this notion in experiments involving compound stim-
uli—stimuli with hierarchical levels of structure (e.g., a large, global 
F constructed from small, local Hs). Observers were presented with 
these stimuli and instructed to identify the letter at either the global 
or the local level. Importantly, the relation between the levels was ei-
ther consistent (global F, local Fs) or inconsistent (global F, local Hs). 
The critical findings were that global were identified faster than local 
letters (global advantage) and that processing of the local level was 
slowed to a greater extent than processing of the global level when the 
global and local object identities were inconsistent (global interfer-
ence). Such findings indicate that global properties can be extracted 
rapidly, suggesting that the potency of an arrow to evoke an uninten-
tional shift of attention may depend on its globality (i.e., its relative 
position in hierarchical space). 
Navon’s (1977, 2003) global-precedence hypothesis assumes that 
the availability of the global level is constant and, therefore, that find-
ings of global advantage should not vary over time. Subsequent work, 
however, has suggested that this assumption may be too strong. In 
particular, there is evidence that the availability of different levels of 
structure of hierarchical patterns changes over time. Kimchi (1998) 
examined the microgenesis of the perceptual organization of hier-
archical stimuli using a primed-matching task. Observers were pre-
sented with a prime (either a few- or a many-element hierarchical pat-
tern), followed by a pair of test figures to be matched for identity. In 
the element similarity test pair condition, the test figures were similar 
to the prime in their elements, but different in their global configura-
tion. In the configuration similarity test pair condition, the test figures 
were similar to the prime in their global configuration, but different in 
their elements. By varying the duration of the prime and constructing 
test figures that were similar to its different aspects, this paradigm al-
lowed changes in observers’ implicit perceptual representations over 
time to be measured. With few-element patterns, the elements were 
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primed at brief exposures, whereas the configuration was primed at 
longer exposures. In contrast, with many-element patterns, the con-
figuration was primed at brief exposures, whereas the elements were 
primed at longer exposures. Similar findings have been obtained with 
compound arrows. Mills and Dodd (2014) presented a spatially un-
informative and task-irrelevant compound arrow (a large, global ar-
row constructed from smaller, local arrows) at fixation, which was 
followed by a peripheral target requiring a simple detection response. 
The directions of the global and local arrows were either consistent 
(same direction) or inconsistent (different directions). The critical 
manipulation was stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The rationale of 
the paradigm is that the priming potency of a level should vary with 
SOA in correspondence with how early that level is processed (Na-
von, 1991). The results indicated that inconsistent arrows produced a 
global cueing effect (target detection was faster when the global rather 
than the local level pointed toward the target) at short SOAs, consis-
tent with a global advantage. At long SOAs, however, a local cueing ef-
fect was observed (target detection was faster when the local rather 
than the global level pointed toward the target), indicative of a local 
advantage. Taken together, these findings suggest that that the unin-
tentional effects of arrows may depend not only on the globality of an 
arrow, but also on its availability over time. 
In sum, previous work suggested that the potency of symbols to 
evoke unintentional shifts of attention may vary with their globality 
and the availability of that percept over time, or with their relevance 
to the current task. Accordingly, in the present study we investigated 
whether the relative impacts of competing symbolic stimuli on at-
tentional control depend on top-down selection processes. In partic-
ular, we used the compound-arrow cueing task introduced by Mills 
and Dodd (2014) to examine the effects of a top-down orienting task 
on the selection of information at the global and local levels of a com-
pound arrow cue. Each trial consisted of two major events (Fig. 1). 
First, a spatially uninformative compound arrow cue was presented 
at fixation. The cues were either consistent (global and local arrows 
pointing in the same direction), inconsistent (global and local arrows 
pointing in opposite directions), local-neutral (a global arrow com-
posed of local rectangles), or global-neutral (a global rectangle com-
posed of local arrows). Second, after a variable delay, a target was 
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presented to the left or right of fixation requiring a simple detection 
response. Participants are instructed that their primary task was tar-
get detection, but that they should also perform one of two second-
ary tasks. In the global orienting task, the arrow cues were oriented 
either perfectly in line with or slightly above or below the horizontal 
midline, and participants were to remember the orientation of the big 
arrow. In the local orienting task, one of the local arrows was a color 
singleton, and participants were to remember its location. Following 
the detection response, a test display was shown presenting two com-
pound arrows, and participants were to select the one that matched 
what they had just seen. 
Fig. 1. Compound arrow cues and validity conditions, as well as example trial se-
quences in Experiment 1. The left panel shows example cue stimuli used for the 
global orienting task, in which the orientation of the global arrow was task-rele-
vant. The right panel shows example cue stimuli used for the local orienting task, 
in which the location of a uniquely colored local arrow/ rectangle was task-rele-
vant. Both sets of cue stimuli were presented in color during the experiment, with 
local arrows colored red (represented here as gray). In the local orienting task, the 
color singleton was green (represented here as black). 
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For consistent cues, the perceptual-precedence and control-setting 
accounts both predict the presence of a spatial cueing effect. For in-
consistent cues, however, the two accounts make different predictions. 
According to the perceptual-precedence account, information at the 
global level is available earlier than information at the local level, and 
therefore receives prioritized processing. For inconsistent cues, then, 
this account predicts that the global level would be selected first, re-
gardless of the orienting task, and that the arrow at this level would 
then produce an unintentional shift of attention. If a target did not 
appear at the location indicated by the global arrow, attention might 
be reoriented back to center and a local arrow could be selected, pro-
vided that the local level was task-relevant. Thus, the perceptual-pre-
cedence account predicts an early, task-independent global cueing ef-
fect, which might later give way to a local cueing effect when the local 
level was task-relevant and the levels conflicted. According to the con-
trol-setting account, in contrast, only arrows possessing a task-rele-
vant feature would enter working memory and compete for attentional 
control. Therefore, for inconsistent cues, this account predicts a task-
compatible level-specific cueing effect, such that a global cueing ef-
fect should be observed in the global orienting task, whereas a local 
cueing effect should be observed in the local orienting task. 
The two accounts also differ in their predictions for local-neu-
tral cues. The perceptual-precedence account predicts that because 
the global level is always prioritized, it would be selected regard-
less of orienting task, and the arrow at this level would produce an 
unintentional shift of attention. Furthermore, because there was no 
conflict between levels, the cueing effect should not vary with SOA. 
In contrast, the control-setting account predicts that the global level 
would be selected only when it was task-relevant. Thus, the global 
cueing effects triggered by local-neutral cues should be observed in 
the global but not in the local orienting task. The two accounts make 
similar predictions for global-neutral cues, albeit for different rea-
sons. The perceptual-precedence account predicts that because pro-
cessing of the global level is obligatory, whereas processing of the lo-
cal level is optional, the local level should be processed only when it is 
task-relevant. Therefore, this account predicts a local cueing effect in 
the local orienting task (given that the local level is task-relevant and 
contains arrows), but not in the global orienting task (given that the 
global level does not contain an arrow). Furthermore, because here 
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there is no conflict between levels, the local cueing effects triggered 
by global-neutral cues should not vary with SOA. The control-setting 
account predicts that the local level would be selected only when it 
was task-relevant. The local cueing effects triggered by global-neutral 
cues, therefore, should be observed in the local but not in the global 
orienting task. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-eight undergraduates from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln 
participated in exchange for course credit. All of the participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the 
experiment, and were informed of their rights of participation accord-
ing to the University of Nebraska–Lincoln institutional review board. 
Stimuli 
The compound arrow cues are shown in Fig. 1. The consistent and in-
consistent cues were structured such that 26 local arrows (each sub-
tending 0.625° × 0.50° visual angle) yielded a single global arrow 
(7.5° × 5.0°). The local-neutral cues were 26 local rectangles (each 
subtending 0.625° × 0.50°) arranged to form a global arrow (7.5° × 
5.0°). The global-neutral cues were 17 local arrows (each subtend-
ing 0.625° × 0.50°) arranged to form a single global rectangle (7.0° 
× 3.0°). In the local orienting task, the local arrows/ rectangles were 
filled with red except for a single arrow/ rectangle that was filled with 
green. In the global orienting task, the local arrows/rectangles were 
filled with red, and the global arrow/rectangle was oriented about the 
horizontal midline –10°, 0°, or 10°. The cues in both tasks were pre-
sented on a white background. 
Procedure 
An example trial sequence for each orienting task is shown in Fig. 1. 
Each trial began with a central fixation point (a black “+” subtending 
1° of visual angle) and was replaced by a compound arrow cue after 
500 ms, which remained onscreen until a response was made on the 
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primary detection task. After a variable SOA (250, 500, or 750 ms), a 
target (a black circle subtending 1° of visual angle) was presented, re-
quiring simple target detection. The cue direction and target location 
were presented with equal probability leftward (“<”) or rightward 
(“>”) and to the left or right of fixation, respectively. The combina-
tion of these factors indexed each cue’s validity state. Thus, the cues 
were either consistent (global and local arrows pointing in the same 
direction), inconsistent (global and local arrows pointing in opposite 
directions), local-neutral (global arrow only), or global-neutral (local 
arrows only), and either valid (pointing toward target location) or in-
valid (pointing away from target location). Because the inconsistent 
cues were technically always valid, given that either the global or the 
local level would always point at the target location, we refer to the 
conditions of its validity state as global-valid (global level pointing at 
target location) and local-valid (local level pointing at target location). 
Accordingly, for inconsistent cues, the usual indicator of attentional 
orienting (the response time [RT] advantage for validly vs. invalidly 
cued target locations) now served as an indicator of level-specific at-
tentional orienting. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar 
as quickly as possible once the target appeared, and to maintain cen-
tral fixation throughout. Moreover, participants were informed that 
the central arrows did not predict the target location and, therefore, 
were irrelevant to the detection task. 
To induce voluntary selection of the global or local arrows, a sec-
ondary task was used to orient attention toward either the global or 
the local level. Participants were told that their primary task was tar-
get detection but that they should also try to perform a secondary task 
in preparation for a test given at the end of each trial. The secondary 
task was a matching task in which participants matched either the 
orientation of the global arrow (global orienting task) or the location 
of a uniquely colored local arrow (local orienting task) to one of two 
alternatives in a test display. The test displays were presented imme-
diately following a detection response and remained present until a 
discrimination response. The intertrial interval was 1,500 ms. Partic-
ipants were seated 48 cm from the monitor and used the keyboard to 
make detection responses (spacebar) and discrimination responses 
(the a or s key for a left or a right response, with the mapping coun-
terbalanced across participants). Testing took place on a Pentium IV 
computer with a 17-in. monitor in a room equipped with soft lighting 
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and sound attenuation. The experimental sessions took place individ-
ually and lasted ~30 min. 
Design 
Participants saw each cue (consistent, inconsistent, local-neutral, or 
global-neutral) at each SOA (250, 500, or 750 ms) and validity state 
(for consistent and neutral cues, valid or invalid; for inconsistent cues, 
global-valid or local-valid) for each orienting task (global or local). 
These 48 conditions were repeated ten times, for a total of 480 trials. 
Cue type was blocked, such that consistent and inconsistent cues were 
presented in one block, and local-neutral and global-neutral cues were 
presented in another block. The block order was fixed across partici-
pants, with the local-neutral/ global-neutral block always performed 
last. Within each cue block, orienting task was also blocked, with the 
task order counterbalanced across participants. 
Results and discussion 
Accuracy on the secondary matching task 
We first report the accuracy data on the secondary matching task. 
Because accuracy was binary (correct or incorrect), we modeled the 
log-odds of the probability of an errant matching response (Hoffman, 
2014). The model included a random intercept for subjects and by-
subject random slopes for within-subjects manipulations (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). The bottom half of Table 1 shows the mean 
probabilities of an error in each condition. The overall probability of 
an error was .18. Though this is somewhat high for relatively easy 
tasks, it was expected because participants were instructed to prior-
itize speed on the primary target detection task. We found a main ef-
fect of cue type, F(3, 91.5) = 8.94, p < .001, in which the mean prob-
abilities of error were greater with consistent (M = .203, SE = .040) 
and inconsistent (M = .201, SE = .039) cues than with local-neutral 
(M = .177, SE = .036) and global-neutral (M = .157, SE = .033) cues 
(ps < .017). A marginally significant Orienting Task × Cue Type × SOA 
interaction also emerged, F(6, 85.8) = 2.03, p = .069. Figure 2 shows 
the mean differences in probabilities of error between orienting tasks 
for each cue type and SOA. The effect of orienting task was not sig-
nificant and did not significantly vary with SOA for consistent, local-
neutral, or global-neutral cues (ps > .301). For inconsistent cues, the 
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Table 1. Mean response times (RTs), in milliseconds, and mean probabilities of 
error, p(error), in each cue by stimulus onset asynchrony condition in Experiment 1. 
Condition Local Orienting Task             Global Orienting Task 
 ValidGV  InvalidLV ValidGV  InvalidLV 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
RT (ms) 
   Consistent 
 250 454 14 469 14 436 14 452 14 
 500 386 14 405 14 374 14 391 14 
 750 376 14 375 14 367 14 393 14 
   Inconsistent 
 250 489 15 475 15 448 15 454 15 
 500 408 15 395 15 378 15 395 15 
 750 381 15 378 15 366 15 393 15 
   Local-neutral 
 250 403 12 426 12 394 12 406 12 
 500 338 12 352 12 333 12 345 12 
 750 322 12 332 12 326 13 327 12 
   Global-neutral 
 250 409 12 412 12 407 12 411 12 
 500 330 12 350 12 334 12 337 12 
 750 319 12 334 12 331 12 332 12 
p(error) 
   Consistent 
 250 .184 .040 .245 .049 .217 .046 .220 .046 
 500 .217 .046 .186 .041 .178 .040 .208 .045 
 750 .252 .051 .185 .041 .158 .037 .202 .044 
   Inconsistent 
 250 .268 .053 .249 .050 .167 .038 .202 .043 
 500 .203 .044 .162 .037 .191 .042 .168 .038 
 750 .223 .047 .175 .039 .217 .046 .212 .045 
   Local-neutral 
 250 .163 .041 .182 .045 .173 .043 .187 .045 
 500 .178 .045 .184 .045 .181 .045 .208 .049 
 750 .166 .043 .152 .040 .171 .044 .179 .045 
   Global-neutral 
 250 .143 .037 .185 .045 .139 .037 .163 .041 
 500 .135 .036 .166 .042 .125 .034 .186 .046 
 750 .165 .043 .134 .036 .176 .045 .174 .044 
GV = global valid; LV = local valid
 
 
Mills  &  Dodd in  Atten Percept  Psychophys  78  (2016)      12
Orienting Task × SOA interaction was significant (p = .050):Whereas 
there was a greater probability of error in the local (M = .259, SE = 
.049) than in the global (M = .183, SE = .038) orienting task at the 
250-ms SOA (p = .028), no difference between tasks was apparent at 
the 500-ms (p = .94) or 750-ms (p = .46) SOAs. This finding may re-
flect interference from the global level at the 250-ms SOA, which at-
tenuated at longer SOAs. No other effects were significant (ps > .11). 
RTs on the primary target detection task 
RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 standard deviations above 
the condition means were removed (4.8 %). Data were analyzed via 
linear mixed modeling, with subjects and items specified as crossed 
random effects (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Hoffman, 2014) and 
by-subject random slopes for within-subjects manipulations (Barr et 
al., 2013). Table 1 shows the mean RTs in each condition. There were 
significant main effects of SOA, F(2, 66.5) = 130.32, p < .001 (targets 
detected faster at longer SOAs), and cue type, F(3, 89.8) = 20.43, 
p < .001 (targets following local-neutral and global-neutral cues were 
detected faster than targets following consistent and inconsistent 
Fig. 2. Mean orienting task effect (local task minus global task) on probabilities of 
error, p(error), in the secondary matching task for each cue type and SOA in Ex-
periment 1. Positive values reflect a greater probability of error in the local orient-
ing task, whereas negative values reflect a greater probability of error in the global 
orienting task. Error bars represent ±1 standard error. 
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cues). The latter finding likely reflects a simple practice effect, given 
that the block of neutral-cue trials always followed the block of con-
sistent/inconsistent-cue trials. The main effect of orienting task was 
marginally significant, F(1, 39.1) = 3.28, p = .078 (targets detected 
faster in the global than in the local orienting task), but this was qual-
ified by a significant Orienting Task × SOA interaction, F(2, 64.9) = 
5.65, p = .006 (smaller effect of orienting task at longer SOAs). Re-
garding spatial cueing effects (Fig. 3), we observed a significant Va-
lidity × Orienting Task × Cue Type interaction, F(4, 54.9) = 4.51, p 
= .001, indicating that the effects of orienting task on the size of the 
cueing effects differed between cue types. 
With consistent cues, we found significant cueing effects in both 
the local (M = –10.83, SE = 4.64, t = –2.33, p = .020) and the global (M 
= –18.99, SE = 4.66, t = – 4.07, p < .001) orienting tasks (targets were 
detected faster when they appeared at the location the global and local 
arrows pointed to), the sizes of which did not significantly differ be-
tween tasks (M = 8.16, SE = 6.57, t = 1.24, p = .215). Although we did 
not manipulate any incentive to ignore the arrow cues, the presence of 
a cueing effect despite the fact that the cue was spatially uninforma-
tive is consistent with the notion that directional symbols presented 
at fixation induce unintentional shifts of attention to locations com-
patible with the meaning of the cue (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Pratt 
& Hommel, 2003; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006, 2012; Ristic et al., 2012). 
With inconsistent cues, significant cueing effects again emerged 
in both the local (M = 9.50, SE = 4.62, t = 2.06, p = .040) and the 
global (M = –15.98, SE = 4.69, t = –3.41, p < .001) orienting tasks, 
the signs of which were in opposite directions, resulting in a signif-
icant difference between the tasks (M = 25.48, SE = 6.58, t = 3.87, 
p < .001). In the local orienting task, the positive sign indicates that 
the cueing effect was due to the local level (targets were detected 
faster when they appeared at the location the local arrows pointed to). 
In the global orienting task, the negative sign indicates that the cueing 
effect was due to the global level (targets were detected faster when 
they appeared at the location the global arrow pointed to). Thus, the 
orienting task determined which level of an inconsistent compound 
arrow cue was selected, and the arrow(s) at this level then produced 
an unintentional shift of attention. This pattern is consistent with a 
control-setting account. 
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Fig. 3. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and SOA in the global orienting task 
(left) and the local orienting task (right) in Experiment 1. For the inconsistent cue, 
negative values reflect a cueing effect due to the global level, whereas positive val-
ues reflect a cueing effect due to the local level. Note that the global-neutral cueing 
effect was remapped (i.e., multiplied by –1) to reflect that this cueing effect was at-
tributable to the local level. Error bars represent ±1 standard error. 
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With global-neutral cues, we found a significant cueing effect in 
the local orienting task (M = –12.22, SE = 6.19, t = –1.97, p = .050), 
with targets being detected faster when they appeared at the location 
the local arrows pointed to. The cueing effect in the global orienting 
task, however, was not significant (M = –3.02, SE = 6.47, t = –0.47, 
p = .641). Thus, when arrows were present at only the local level of a 
compound cue, cueing effects were observed only when the current 
task goal specified that the local level was task-relevant. Otherwise, 
these local arrows appeared to have been ignored. Since the only dif-
ference between the present global-neutral cue and the one in Mills 
and Dodd (2014, Exp. 3), which did produce a significant cueing ef-
fect, was the task-relevant nature of the global level, it is reasonable 
to interpret the present finding with global-neutral cues in terms of 
global precedence. 
With local-neutral cues, significant cueing effects emerged once 
again in both the local (M = –15.67, SE = 6.12, t = –2.56, p = .011) 
and global (M = –12.40, SE = 6.31, t = –1.97, p = .050) orienting tasks 
(targets were detected faster when they appeared at the location the 
global arrow pointed to), the size of which did not significantly differ 
between the tasks (M = – 3.33, SE = 9.07, t = –0.37, p = .713). Thus, 
when an arrow was present at only the global level of a compound 
cue, cueing effects were observed regardless of the current task goal. 
This pattern speaks to the inevitability of processing global informa-
tion and the optional processing of local information, in line with a 
global-precedence account. 
The four-way interaction was not significant (p = .21), indicating 
that the pattern of cueing effects did not vary with SOA. Considering 
that Mills and Dodd (2014) showed that the cueing effect with incon-
sistent cues changed with SOA— such that a global cueing effect was 
observed at a 250-ms SOA, whereas a local cueing effect was observed 
at a 750-ms SOA—the absence of an influence of SOA in the present 
experiment may suggest that, rather than causing the local or global 
advantage per se, the effect of orienting task was to enhance, atten-
uate, or otherwise maintain the availability of level-specific informa-
tion. This would explain both the presence of a local cueing effect with 
inconsistent cues at the 250-ms SOA, as well as the lack of an SOA ef-
fect with inconsistent cues. 
To summarize, a task-compatible, level-specific cueing effect 
was observed when the two levels of structure conflicted (i.e., with 
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inconsistent cues), which is in line with a control-setting account. Yet, 
when there was no such conflict, the results were consistent with a 
global-precedence account: When the cue was a global arrow composed 
of local rectangles (i.e., a local-neutral cue), a cueing effect was ob-
served regardless of orienting task, and when the cue was a global rect-
angle composed of local arrows (i.e., a global-neutral cue), a cueing 
effect was observed in the local orienting task but not in the global ori-
enting task, findings compatible with some form of global precedence. 
More generally, the emerging suggestion is that shifts in precedence de-
pend on the conflict between levels. This is consistent with Mills and 
Dodd (2014), with the exception that that study included no orienting 
task. In light of the present findings, this suggests that the level-spe-
cific advantage may not have been due to the task per se, but rather to 
conflict between the levels, with the effect of task serving to modulate 
the availability of the level-specific information, effectively prolonging 
(in the case of task-relevant global information) or expediting (in the 
case of task-relevant local information) the advantage at a given level. 
It should be noted, however, that although the two orienting tasks 
clearly required responses to either the global or the local level, the ar-
row cues differed between the tasks, which raises the possibility that 
this difference may have had some influence on the results. This dif-
ference may be particularly problematic for the cues containing local 
arrows, because the local arrows, at the stimulus level and indepen-
dent of the task, were more salient in the local orienting task (a sin-
gle green arrow among red arrows) than in the global orienting task 
(all red arrows). By itself, this stimulus level difference—local arrows 
being more salient in the local than in the global orienting task—could 
potentially explain the finding with global-neutral cues, where a sig-
nificant cueing effect was observed in the local orienting task (targets 
detected faster when they appeared at the location the local arrows 
pointed to), but not in the global orienting task. It is unclear, there-
fore, to what extent this finding with global-neutral cues can be at-
tributed to the orienting task. Likewise, differential local salience be-
tween the tasks could also explain the finding with inconsistent cues, 
where a significant local cueing effect was observed in the local ori-
enting task (targets detected faster when they appeared at the loca-
tion the local arrows pointed to) and a significant global cueing ef-
fect was observed in the global orienting task (targets detected faster 
when they appeared at the location the global arrow pointed to). If 
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local salience, independent of the orienting task, was responsible for 
the different patterns of cueing effects with inconsistent cues between 
tasks, then local salience should produce significant local cueing ef-
fects regardless of the relevancy of a particular level to a given task. 
In Experiment 2 we tested this possibility. In particular, Experiment 
2 tested whether a local color singleton can draw attention to the lo-
cal level and reverse the precedence effect. 
Experiment 2 
To test the possibility that local salience was responsible for the pat-
tern of cueing effects in the local orienting task in the previous exper-
iment, in Experiment 2, one of the local arrows was a color singleton 
(single green arrow among red arrows, just as in the local orienting 
task of Exp. 1), but there was no secondary orienting task. Accordingly, 
if local salience was responsible for the local cueing effects with incon-
sistent cues in the local orienting task in Experiment 1 (as opposed to 
the orienting task per se), local cueing effects should be observed once 
again. Moreover, just as in Experiment 1, local cueing effects with in-
consistent cues should be independent of SOA. If the global orienting 
task was responsible for the lack of a local cueing effect with global-
neutral cues in Experiment 1, then we should now find a significant 
local cueing effect with global-neutral cues, given that the global rect-
angle was no longer task-relevant. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduates from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln par-
ticipated in exchange for course credit. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, were naïve to the purpose of the experi-
ment, and were informed of their rights of participation according to 
the University of Nebraska–Lincoln institutional review board. None 
of the participants had taken part in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli, procedure, and design 
The compound arrow cue stimuli were the same as in the local orient-
ing task in Experiment 1. The procedure was also the same, except that 
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there was no secondary matching task, meaning that cue processing 
was now entirely incidental to the detection task. Thus, participants 
were informed that the central arrows did not predict the location of a 
target and, therefore, were irrelevant to the detection task and should 
be ignored. The design was also the same as in Experiment 1, except 
that more trials were presented and that, rather than a single block 
of consistent/inconsistent cues being followed by one block of neutral 
cues, now four blocks of each were presented, which were interleaved. 
This modification was made to determine whether it would eliminate 
the suspected practice effect (i.e., the main effect of cue type) from 
Experiment 1. Thus, participants saw each cue (consistent, inconsis-
tent, local-neutral, or global-neutral) at each SOA (250, 500, or 750 
ms) and validity state (for consistent and neutral cues, valid or invalid; 
for inconsistent cues, global-valid or local-valid). These 24 conditions 
were repeated 27 times, for a total of 648 trials. The experimental ses-
sions took place individually and lasted ~45 min. 
Results and discussion 
Prior to all analyses, RTs less than 100 ms or greater than 2.5 stan-
dard deviations above the condition means were removed (5.7 %). 
The data were analyzed via linear mixed modeling, with subjects and 
items specified as crossed random effects (Baayen et al., 2008; Hoff-
man, 2014) and by-subject random slopes for within-subjects manip-
ulations (Barr et al., 2013). We observed a significant main effect of 
SOA, F(2, 92.3) = 67.19, p < .001 (targets detected faster at longer 
SOAs). The main effect of cue type, which had been significant in Ex-
periment 1, was no longer significant, F(3, 63.9) = 1.62, p = .19, likely 
due to the increased number of blocks and their interleaving. Regard-
ing spatial cueing effects (Fig. 4), a significant Validity × SOA inter-
action emerged, F(2, 66.8) = 4.12, p = .02. Cueing effects were signif-
icant at the 250-ms SOA (M = –15.55, SE = 4.69, t = –3.32, p = .002) 
and were significantly smaller at the 500-ms SOA by (M = –12.37, 
SE = 6.11, t = –2.02, p = .05), as well as at the 750-ms SOA by (M = 
–17.09, SE = 6.17, t = –2.77, p = .007). The –3.18 ms cueing effect at 
the 500-ms SOA (i.e., –15.55 minus –12.37) and the 1.54 ms cueing ef-
fect at the 750-ms SOA (i.e., –15.55 minus – 17.09) were not signif-
icantly different from zero (ps > .51) or from each other (t = –0.76, 
SE = 6.18, p = .45). Importantly, we found a significant Cue Type × 
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Validity interaction, F(3, 45.5) = 4.01, p = .013, indicating that the 
sizes of the cueing effects differed between cue types. Significant cue-
ing effects occurred with consistent (M = –13.45, SE = 6.85, t = –1.96, 
p = .05), local-neutral (M = –12.76, SE = 6.30, t = –2.03, p = .05), and 
global-neutral (M = –12.49, SE = 6.19, t = –2.02, p = .05) cues, none 
of which differed (ps > .92). Each, however, was significantly differ-
ent from the cueing effect with inconsistent cues (ts > 2.78, SEs ~ 9, 
ps < .01). With inconsistent cues, the cueing effect at the 250-ms SOA 
was due to the global level (M = –10.82, SE = 6.31, t = –1.75, p = .078), 
but the cueing effects at the 500-ms (M = 18.67, SE = 7.41, t = 2.52, 
p = .027) and 750-ms (M = 14.95, SE = 7.63, t = 1.96, p = .050) SOAs 
were due to the local level. 
If local salience accounted for the local cueing effects in the local 
orienting task in Experiment 1, then local salience should produce a 
local cueing effect independent of the status of the local level with re-
spect to the task. Moreover, just as in Experiment 1, the local cueing 
effect should not vary with SOA. The results of Experiment 2 did not 
Fig. 4. Mean spatial cueing effects (valid minus invalid or, for the inconsistent cue, 
global-valid minus local-valid) for each cue type and SOA in Experiment 2. For 
the inconsistent cue, negative values reflect a cueing effect due to the global level, 
whereas positive values reflect a cueing effect due to the local level. Note that the 
global-neutral cueing effect was remapped (i.e., multiplied by –1) to reflect that 
this cueing effect was attributable to the local level. Error bars represent ±1 stan-
dard error. 
Mills  &  Dodd in  Atten Percept  Psychophys  78  (2016)      20
support this possibility. With inconsistent cues—despite a local cue-
ing effect at the 500-ms and 750-ms SOAs—neither a global nor a lo-
cal cueing effect was found at the 250-ms SOA (in fact, the trend was 
toward a global cueing effect), possibly suggesting that global pro-
cessing passively interfered with local processing (e.g., Navon, 1977; 
Sanocki, 2001) or that local salience biased the competition for selec-
tion between levels (Hommel & Akyürek, 2009; Hommel et al., 2001; 
Pratt & Hommel, 2003) by attenuating the availability of the global 
level and/or by enhancing the availability of the local level. In any 
case, these results indicate that a local-level entry point for visual pro-
cessing is not obligatory, even under conditions in which it might be 
expected. This indicates that a local color singleton was not sufficient 
to produce the early and temporally stable local cueing effect with in-
consistent cues in the local orienting task in Experiment 1. Similarly, 
with global-neutral cues, whereas no cueing effect had emerged in the 
global orienting task in Experiment 1, now we observed a significant 
and temporally stable cueing effect. This suggests that the former re-
sult was not due to the absence of a color singleton at the local level. 
Thus, the orienting task, not salience, appears to have been responsi-
ble for the pattern of cueing effects in Experiment 1. 
General discussion 
In the present study, we examined whether the influence of compet-
ing symbolic stimuli at different levels of structure on attentional con-
trol depends on top-down selection processes. Certain aspects of our 
results suggest that this was the case. In particular, we found posi-
tive evidence that attention could be allocated voluntarily to a spe-
cific level of a compound symbol. This was shown by a task-compati-
ble level-specific cueing effect: With inconsistent cues in which global 
and local arrows pointed in opposite directions, a local cueing effect 
was observed in the local orienting task (target detection was faster 
for targets appearing at the location indicated by the local arrows), 
whereas a global cueing effect was observed in the global orienting 
task (target detection was faster for targets appearing at the location 
indicated by the global arrow). Thus, the current task goals deter-
mined the level of structure selected, and the directional meaning of 
the arrow(s) at this level subsequently induced an unintentional shift 
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of attention. These findings are comparable with previous work that 
has examined the influence of competing symbols at the same level 
of structure (Pratt & Hommel, 2003). 
Though top-down control of attention via orienting task made it 
possible to select information at either level of structure depending 
on which level was task-relevant, other aspects of the present results 
suggest that this type of selection was insufficient for restricting se-
lection only to arrows at the local level. In particular, we observed a 
local-neutral cueing effect (i.e., a cueing effect due to the global level) 
not only in the global orienting task, but also in the local orienting 
task, indicating that access to symbolic information at the global level 
was not prevented when attending to the location of a local rectangle. 
This finding is inconsistent with the predictions of a top-down con-
trol-setting account, which suggests that because the global arrow’s 
directional information was irrelevant to the local orienting task, it 
should not have been processed, and therefore no cueing effect should 
have been observed (Folk et al., 1992). Instead, this finding is more in 
line with a perceptual precedence account (Navon, 1977), which sug-
gests that the processing of information at the global level is obliga-
tory, whereas the processing of information at the local level is op-
tional. According to this account, the local-neutral cueing effect was 
observed regardless of orienting task because there was an arrow at 
the highest level of globality (i.e., the relative position of an item in 
hierarchical space). Because processing of the global level is obliga-
tory, this level was selected, and the arrow at this level then induced 
an unintentional shift of attention. 
Interestingly, a global-neutral cueing effect (i.e., a cueing effect 
due to the local level) was observed in the local but not the global ori-
enting task. On the one hand, this might indicate that access to sym-
bolic information at the local level was prevented when attending to 
the orientation of a global rectangle, consistent with the predictions 
of a top-down control-setting account. On the other hand, consider-
ing that this task-level compatibility effect was not observed with lo-
cal-neutral cues (indicating that access to symbolic information at the 
global level could not be prevented when attending to the location of a 
local rectangle), the perceptual-precedence account seems to provide 
a more complete account of the data for the two neutral cue types. Ac-
cordingly, the global-neutral cueing effect may reflect the processing 
of information at the local level being optional (Navon, 1977). That 
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is, because the local level was not task-relevant in the global orient-
ing task, it was not processed, and as a result no cueing effect was ob-
served. Taken together, the patterns of spatial cueing effects for the 
two types of neutral cues suggest that cueing effects triggered by the 
global level may be more strongly reflexive than those triggered by 
the local level, insofar as the spatial orienting effect for local-neutral 
cues (due to global level) could withstand violations to a nonspatial 
task-level attentional set, whereas the spatial orienting effect for the 
global-neutral cue (due to the local level) could not. 
Although the two orienting tasks clearly required responses to 
either the global or the local level, the natures of the tasks differed, 
which raises the possibility that this difference may have had some 
influence on the results. Namely, the local and global orienting tasks 
differed not only in terms of whether a response to either the local or 
the global level of a compound cue was required, but also in terms of 
the salience of the arrows at the local level. Therefore, the local cue-
ing effect with inconsistent cues in the local orienting task may have 
been driven by salience as opposed to orienting task. Similarly, the 
null local cueing effect with global-neutral cues in the global orient-
ing task may have been due to a nonsalient local level. In Experiment 
2 we examined this possibility. This experiment was a replication of 
Mills and Dodd (2014), with the exception that one of the local ar-
rows was a color singleton. As in that study, with inconsistent cues, 
we found a global cueing effect at the 250-ms SOA and local cueing ef-
fects at the longer SOAs. Thus, with inconsistent cues, a color single-
ton at the local level did not produce early local cueing effects (Exp. 2) 
unless the local level was task-relevant (Exp. 1). Likewise, with global-
neutral cues, we found significant cueing effects regardless of SOA. 
These findings suggest that the effects of orienting task on the sizes of 
the cueing effects with inconsistent and global-neutral cues in Exper-
iment 1 were indeed due to orienting task, not salience. Accordingly, 
we conclude that the results support a version of global precedence 
in which the task set can either maintain the availability of the global 
level (evident by the absence of SOA effects on global cueing effects 
when the global level was task-relevant; Exp. 1) or instead attenuate 
its availability (evident by the absence of SOA effects on local cueing 
effects when the local level was task-relevant; Exp. 1). 
According to Navon’s (1977, 2003) global-precedence hypothesis, 
the availability of the global level is constant and does not attenuate, 
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even when attention is focused on the local level. Subsequent find-
ings, however, have suggested that this assumption may be too strong, 
since there is ample evidence that the availabilities of different lev-
els of structure of hierarchical patterns vary with time (e.g., Kimchi, 
1998; Mills & Dodd, 2014). An effect of processing duration (i.e., SOA) 
on the global advantage (Exp. 2; see also Mills & Dodd, 2014), there-
fore, does not support Navon’s original global precedence hypothesis, 
but it is consistent with a weaker version in which the availability of 
the global level can be modulated over time (Navon, 1991). Therefore, 
we speculate that an effect of SOA was not observed in Experiment 1 
because the task relevancy of a particular level modulated the avail-
ability of that level, effectively prolonging (in the case of task-rele-
vant global information) or expediting (in the case of task-relevant 
local information) the availability, and thus the dominance, of level-
specific information. Only in the absence of direct task demands is 
there an obligatory global-to-local change in advantage (Exp. 2; Mills 
& Dodd, 2014), and even then, only in the presence of conflict. The 
emerging picture here is that shifts in precedence depend on conflict 
between levels. 
So far, experiments using the compound-arrow cueing procedure 
have required only simple detection responses to a 1° target (Exps. 
1–2; see also Mills & Dodd, 2014). It is possible that such a simple 
(coarse) judgment might have permitted what Theeuwes (2004) has 
referred to as a “wide attentional window.” If detection responses to 
a 1° target permitted a wide attentional window, then the spatial cue-
ing task may have introduced a top-down bias toward global process-
ing across all conditions. This bias presumably would have an addi-
tive effect with the orienting bias manipulated with the secondary 
matching task in Experiment 1 and, therefore, may be overpowered 
by conditions conspiring to produce a local advantage. This overall 
top-down bias toward processing the global level, speculative as it 
may be, might have manifested itself in the finding that when the cue 
was a global arrow composed of local rectangles (local-neutral cue) 
a cueing effect was observed even in the local orienting task (Exp. 1, 
Fig. 3). Although this hypothesis is attractive, at least three pieces of 
evidence cast doubt on it. First, we obtained a (global) cueing effect 
with local-neutral cues in the local orienting task. Since previous work 
has shown that top-down attention to pop-out local items weakens 
the global advantage (Han & He, 2003), it might be expected that a 
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top-down bias toward global processing induced by a wide attentional 
window should be weakened in the local orienting task and, there-
fore, that the local-neutral cueing effect should be smaller than in the 
global orienting task. However, we found no difference between the 
tasks—if anything, the effect was larger in the local orienting task. 
Second, Lamb and Robertson (1988) found that responses to the local 
level of a central hierarchical stimulus were longer when stimuli oc-
curred randomly and were mixed with peripherally presented stimuli, 
as compared with a condition in which all stimuli were always pre-
sented at central fixation. They suggested that with central presenta-
tion, a smaller focus of attention could be maintained, leading to en-
hanced local processing. Because our cues were presented at central 
fixation, it might be expected that no global advantage should result, 
given that attention was consistently directed at a level (via the task 
manipulation) within a block of trials. Finally, we considered some-
thing like this hypothesis in Mills and Dodd (2014, Exp. 3), in which 
cue–target eccentricity was manipulated, the logic being that a wide 
attentional window would predict a cue–target proximity effect. How-
ever, none was found—eccentricity did not alter the pattern. Conse-
quently, spatial uncertainty, presumably a condition of diffuse or wide 
attention, does not seem to affect the size of the global advantage, at 
least not when cue processing is incidental and both levels are related 
to as objects. 
In summary, we found that interactions between the task demands 
and the structure of the input information selectively modulate the 
relative needs of visual information at different levels of stimulus 
structure. To select symbols at different levels of structure, therefore, 
the present work suggests that at least two factors need to be consid-
ered: the observer’s current task, which specifies the demands of vi-
sual information from the input, and the globality of this visual in-
formation across the percept, which specifies the availability of the 
percept for selection. Studies investigating the determinants of selec-
tion efficiency typically draw on tasks requiring selective attention 
to centrally presented local information while ignoring irrelevant pe-
ripheral information, as in flanker tasks. Moreover, the stimuli used 
in these studies are generally perceptually simple, containing seman-
tic information at only one level of stimulus structure, as in a single 
central arrow. Many structural differences exist between the stimuli 
presented in traditional studies of selectivity and the sort of stimuli 
Mills  &  Dodd in  Atten Percept  Psychophys  78  (2016)       25
found in the real world (e.g., hierarchical levels of structure, depth 
planes). Considering that differences in stimulus structure are known 
to influence processing strategies (Garner, 1970, 1974), understand-
ing the role of stimulus structure in information processing will be 
crucial for understanding how various factors influence selective at-
tention. Ignoring the nature of the stimulus would lead, at worst, to 
incorrect assessment of the nature of information processing, and, at 
best, to an inadequate picture. A goal for future research, therefore, 
should be to understand how other dimensions of stimulus structure, 
such as a target’s location in depth on a three-dimensional plane, con-
tribute to selectivity.  
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